The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-Competition: Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron by Langevoort, Donald C.
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2002 
The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-Competition: Corporate 
Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron 
Donald C. Langevoort 
Georgetown University Law Center, langevdc@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/132 
 
70 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 968-975 (2002) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons 
GEORGETOWN LAW 
Faculty Publications 
 
 
 
 
January 2010 
 
 
 
The Organizational Psychology of  
Hyper-Competition: Corporate Irresponsibility 
and the Lessons of Enron 
 
 
 
 
70 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 968-975 (2002) 
 
Donald C. Langevoort  
Professor of Law 
Georgetown University Law Center 
langevdc@law.georgetown.edu 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from: 
Scholarly Commons:  http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/132/ 
 
 
Posted with permission of the author 
The Organizational Psychology of
Hyper-Competition: Corporate
Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron
Donald C. Langevoort*
I. Introduction
Were I not to know better, sadly, it might seem that the recent Enron
fiasco was just a publicity stunt for Larry Mitchell's Corporate Irresponsibil-
ity: America's Newest Export.' So much of what the book says rings true
with what we are learning about Enron's obsession with using short-term
earnings numbers to prompt (with the aid of an elaborate set of smoke and
mirrors) a grossly inflated stock price. And unfortunately, it was a mindset
that produced severe social dislocation, especially for Enron's employees, its
local community, and so many undiversified investors.
Corporate Irresponsibility is clearly right to ask whether there is some-
thing the law can and should do to counter the unhealthy effects of this kind
of obsession, and there is much to admire in its set of proposals. I have to
confess to being somewhat skeptical, however, about corporate law's capacity
to change this kind of behavior if legal reform comes in the relatively mild
tweaking the book advocates. Like its author, moreover, I am not confident
that there is a more radical, efficacious strategy that would appeal within the
rough constraints of capitalism as we know it. So what I want to do here is
first explain my fears and then explore the Enron story from the standpoint
of both social psychology and organizational behavior. My sense going in, at
least, is that the social forces and selfish norms that emerge fairly naturally in
highly competitive settings such as these dominate as behavioral influences
over anything but high-powered legal controls.
The kind of firm that I want to concentrate on is the "new economy"
sort that requires a high rate of creative productivity from a large number of
key managers and employees. Thus, I will put to the side the few remaining
monopolistic public utilities, as well as firms with high rates of free cash flow
from entrenched market power. The paradigmatic examples that I am inter-
ested in are knowledge and service-based firms in markets with relatively low
barriers to entry and high rewards for innovation. Enron clearly was one of
these.
II. The Internal Structure of Hyper-Competitive Firms
The task faced by firms in these settings is to design a work structure
that induces high-velocity productivity by key employees. This is absolutely
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1 LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA'S NEWEST Ex-
PORT (2001).
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essential: should a critical mass of motivation and talent be lacking, the firm
will not be competitive, and will fail. So what should this structure look like?
We begin with the selection of these employees at the entry-level (in-
cluding employees who are at even more advanced stages of their careers).
Based on the assumption, discussed more fully below, that monitoring will
not be overly intense, the firm needs people with che personality characteris-
tics associated with high productivity in lightly supervised settings. Here, we
can go right to the human resources playbook-the common characteristics
sought are things like "ambitious," "competitive," "a self-starter," "persis-
tent," "positive," and the favorite, "a team player." At the entry-level, espe-
cially, those characteristics are imperfectly observable; hence, hiring
decisions are heuristic at best.2
What kind of person meets these characteristics, and what is that person
like? Most of these adjectives describe a person with a high need for recogni-
tion and achievement, and with a high degree of self-confidence. The latter,
in particular, is associated with what psychologists call egocentric biases-an
inflated sense of self-efficacy and ability to control. Such people are not nec-
essarily realists, but optimists-a trait directly associated with persistence and
risk-taking.3 The outlier in this cluster of personality, traits is "team player."
The level of personal ambition has to be tempered by loyalty to the group-
otherwise it poses a distinct threat to the organization's interests. There is a
balance here that is hard to achieve because loyalty is somewhat easy to fake,
especially early on.
The people selected to work at the firm are then put into vigorous com-
petition, both externally and with each other. In many firms, people tend to
work in teams on projects, rather than alone. This permits some degree of
monitoring and supervision by the team leader and other team members, al-
though this is likely to be very imperfect monitoring. We know that too in-
tense supervision over highly discretionary tasks tends to crowd out internal
motivation, leading to reduced productivity.4 Key employees will thus tend
to be given some autonomous "space" to conduct business without intense
oversight.
With imperfect observation comes the tendency to base promotions and
rewards on some combination of outputs, either individual or by team, and
internal evaluations. As to the former, at least, quotas and targets emerge,
and it is the relative performance of the key employees that counts. Where
there is team-based organization, teams are frequently reconstituted so that
individual productivity can be more easily teased out. As many people have
pointed out, something of a tournament emerges in this environment. And
2 For a very sophisticated approach to human resources, recognizing the economic and
psychological constraints, see generally JAMES N. BARON & DAVID M. KREPS, STRATEGIC
HUMAN RESOURCES: FRAMEWORKS FOR GENERAL MANAGERS (1999).
3 See MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, LEARNED OPTIMISM 100-12 (1991). I have elaborated on
this, from a securities law perspective, in Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behav-
ioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social
Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1997).
4 E.g., Jennifer S. Lerner& Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability,
125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 259 (1999).
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the interesting question to me is whether there is some survivorship bias in
terms of the personality characteristics of those who win in these highly com-
petitive settings and move up the corporate ladder. I suspect so, and am
troubled by this.
To some extent, the winners will tend to be those who (natural skills
aside) are most ambitious, hard-working, persistent, etc.-exactly what the
firm was looking for. They will get a sense of the prevailing metric and out-
perform their peers on it. Where teamwork is valued, however, they will
have to restrain their personal ambition, or at least appear to do so in the
eyes of higher powers. This is an important point. -As noted earlier, from the
standpoint of the superiors making the promotion decision, it is essential not
to promote the purely self-centered, for he or she will not be other-regarding
enough (as to their interests, if nothing else) once given substantial autono-
mous power. Thus, there is a great deal of emphasis placed on innate loyalty,
while at the same time recognizing how easily it can be faked.
Who, then, is the person who can simultaneously be so competitive and
yet loyal? I think that the answer is those people who bond quickly to their
team-both expressing and feeling intense loyalty-while at the same time
behaving very aggressively vis-A-vis outsiders.5 This kind of person needs to
be adept at rationalizing a shift in loyalties as conditions dictate. Sadly, re-
searchers have put two apt labels on the kinds of people who do this well
time and time again. One is "Machiavellian"-a standard psychological mea-
sure. This is characterized by an astuteness regarding alliances to make, peo-
ple to impress, and how to manipulate. "High-Mach" scores correlate with
organizational success, especially in discretionary fields such as sales and
management. 6 This label connotes deliberate cunning and opportunism, but
it need not be like this-recall that organizations are threatened by blatant
egoism. It is the behavior, not the state of mind, that is important. Hence,
there is a second label that I like: ethical plasticity, inspired by Robert Jack-
all's work on business ethics. 7 In tournament structures, successful execu-
tives have an ability-born in what psychologists term self-serving
inference- to construe what is self-serving to be reasonable, so that moral
anxiety is buffered. They convincingly appear as highly loyal team players
because-via the magic of self-deception-that is how they see themselves.
But they find ready excuses to shift loyalties, without guilt, as the local com-
petitive conditions change. This lets them stay "focused" and able "to take
care of business"-other popular words and phrases from the human re-
sources playbook. They are grease, rather than grit, in a high-velocity setting.
Unburdened by moral anxiety, they are valued and rewarded.
5 The training grounds that model these traits in pure form are athletic teams and the
military, and rhetoric from these settings is commonly imported into business cultures.
6 Samuel Bowles et al., The Determinants of Earnings: A Behavioral Approach, 39 J.
EcoN. LIT. 1137, 1161-62 (2001); Myron Gable & Frank Dangello, Locus of Control, Machiavel-
lianism and Managerial Job Performance, J. PSYCHOL. 599 (1994).
7 See ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS 203
(1988) ("Only those with an inexhaustible capacity for self-rationalization, fueled by boundless
ambition, can escape the discomfort such compromises produce."). Jackall's emphasis is on the
need for flexibility if one is to be a survivor in a series of "probationary crucibles." Id. at 192.
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On average, then, survivors in highly competitive organizations are those
who best exhibit these traits. But I do not want to pretend that personalities
within organizations are static over time. Especially when organizations have
sought people with high self-esteem going in, egocentric biases are enhanced
at each step up the organizational ladder. Whatever may have been the rea-
sons for success (luck, perhaps, or good social skills), managers are likely to
self-interpret their success in terms of talent, skill, and just dessert. Self-es-
teem grows, with the predictable increase in resistance to information that is
inconsistent with inflated self-image. At the very top of the organization, we
see a rarefied group of survivors very adept at producing, but with dimin-
ished capacity to see things as they really are. Indeed, the noted organiza-
tional psychologist Michael Macoby has claimed that the ultimate
tournament survivors in high-growth "intangible"-based firms is often the
hard core narcissist-a personality trait (disorder in severe instances) that
often produces highly charismatic leadership coupled with a strong disinclina-
tion to accept or admit the truth.8
So far, I have focused on personality, which is inherently individual. But
culture is also important as it sets the normative ground rules for both belief
and action within the firm.9 Without revisiting the extensive literature on
corporate cultures, I will simply suggest that these cultures are often the re-
flection of the internal reward system over time. Those who succeed within
the system determine, indirectly at least, what is valued. Their behaviors that
gave rise to success will be imitated, and over many iterations, replicated.
The most adaptive corporate cultures are ones that reflect the key personal-
ity traits-optimism, persistence, and competitiveness. The most powerful
consequence, when a functional corporate culture emerges, is that it helps
build an identity-a sense of manifest destiny that with luck can turn into a
self-fulfilling prophecy-within the organization. That has mainly positive
consequences (higher levels of internal motivation and trust) but the poten-
tial for negative ones (in-group biases that brand outsiders as inferior10 and
silencing of dissenting voices) as well.
What I am suggesting, in sum, is that success in highly competitive busi-
ness organizations is skewed in the direction of rewarding those who are
highly focused at the business of competing, which of necessity means the
cognitive ability to block out concerns-like difficult ethical problems-that
are likely to be distracting.11 Jackall puts it well: "Only those with an inex-
haustible capacity for self-rationalization, fueled by boundless ambition, can
escape the discomfort such compromises produce.' 1 2 As to the prevailing
competitive metric, I suspect that it is two-fold: whatever the definition is
8 See Michael Macoby, Narcissistic Leaders: The Incredible Pros, the Inevitable Cons,
HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 69-70.
9 For a useful perspective on the person-culture nexus, see generally Barry Staw & Rob-
ert Sutton, Macro Organizational Psychology, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS 350
(J. Keith Murnighan ed., 1993).
10 See Paul F. Levy, The Nut Island Effect: When Good Teams Go Wrong, HARV. Bus.
REV., March 2001, at 52.
11 See David M. Messick & Max H. Bazerman, Ethical Leadership and the Psychology of
Decision Making, 37 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 9, 20 (1996).
12 JACKALL, supra note 7, at 203.
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with respect to competitive success (something to do with profitability, at
least), tested by some combination of performance data with respect to the
team in question and a style that bespeaks efficiency-a style that is politi-
cally nimble, decisive, action-oriented, and confident. Here we see some-
thing important. On average, upper echelons of organizations like these will
be less and less likely to have people whose inclination is to worry, or to
doubt, especially about things that go to the heart of the organization's self-
identity. Worries and doubts appear at these levels, of course, but only when
presented starkly, which often is too late.
If I am right about this, then the seeds of corporate irresponsibility are
endogenous ones, not the product of external norms such as law or share-
holder primacy. But haven't I proved too much? If the account is as bleak as
I seem to be suggesting, what explains the presence of at least some seem-
ingly functional, socially sensitive organizations out there? The answer-
which Corporate Irresponsibility occasionally hints at-is that, most of the
time, a high degree of attention to groups such as the company's workforce,
creditors, supplier base, etc. is smart. All other things being equal, "high-
Mach" senior management teams will bargain with these other constituencies
in a savvy way, recognizing that many of the relationships are for the long-
term and thus cheating opportunities are diminished. And, as I have argued
elsewhere, this inclination to share will be strongest when the control group is
optimistic about the future, and sees much left over for itself even after being
generous with others (precisely why optimistic, "can-do" corporate cultures
are so adaptive). 13 The stress point comes only when bad times threaten and
the management team senses the coming of a "last period." That is when its
darker, Machiavellian instincts take hold.
I have gotten to this point while saying relatively little about something
that is central both to Corporate Irresponsibility and the Enron story: stock-
price obsession. Nothing in what I have said necessarily explains why the
control group would find stock price maximization so profoundly compelling;
all I have said is that I think the motivations in these kinds of organizations
are largely endogenous and self-serving. Let me offer three explanations,
one of which is obvious (and one of the chief culprits offered by the book).
That obvious one is stock-based compensation plans, which tie the execu-
tives' interests to a high stock price whenever sales or hedging activity is per-
mitted. I share the view that, as typically designed, these are often
troublesome, encouraging near-term stock price inflation by whatever means
practicable.
But there are others. As Enron shows, a high stock price has an inde-
pendent competitive purpose-it provides an acquisition currency and a
source of collateral that can be used to facilitate substantial (often hidden)
leveraging. To a growth-oriented firm, this is crucially important. Also, and
perhaps more subtly, stock price is a metric by which to test the success of the
control group currently in power in a firm with much hard-to-measure value,
and hence goes deeply to their sense of identity. We have to remember that
executive job turnover in these kinds of organizations is increasingly fre-
13 See Langevoort, supra note 3, at 155.
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quent; many at the top doubt that they can count on being there for the long
run. For all these reasons, I fear that near-term stock-price obsession in ag-
gressive knowledge-based organizations is naturally embedded, and not eas-
ily overcome.
III. Enron's Story
In this light, let me speculate-and I emphasize that word-in very gen-
eral terms on what may have occurred at Enron to lead to the company's
sudden implosion and the consequential social damage. To do this, of course,
we have to identify the cause(s) of the implosion, which is not an easy task.
Here, I will build on Bill Bratton's account,14 which suggests that the stock
market too easily trusted Enron's cosmetically enhanced earnings and failed
to identify the risks associated with the derivatives activity. Upon discover-
ing the truth, investors and lenders exacted a heavy toll. Particularly signifi-
cant was the use of Enron stock as an inducement for third parties to provide
capital to the equity affiliates and special purpose entities in the late stages of
the company's expansion, which in turn helped disguise the deteriorating ec-
onomic condition of the company. Although the self-dealing nature of these
transactions was troubling, they were probably not a proximate cause of the
implosion. And we should at least note that the six million dollar shortfall in
outside capital, which is what it would have taken to justify treating the Jedi
and Chewco partnerships as independent, was probably trivial in and of it-
self-the harm would have come upon discovery of the nature of the risks
hidden within the company whether or not this accounting convention had
been followed.
I will also assume that, initially, Enron's business model of being a domi-
nating market-maker was a sound one on which to build a business, and pro-
duced a round of initial success within the company's core product
competence, the energy business. Indeed, this initial success was the root
cause of the later demise. Enron was filled with people who met the job
description set out in the previous section: optimistic, aggressive, and fo-
cused. The culture quickly identified itself as special and uniquely compe-
tent, believing that special skill rather than luck (or just being first) was
responsible for the early victories. That self-definition then set a standard for
how up-and-coming people acted out their roles: Enron was a place for win-
ners. With this-and the stock market's positive feedback-the company's
aspiration level rose.15
This aspiration level required a high level of risk-taking by the firm,
though like many egocentric people, key decision-makers were probably
overconfident in their ability to manage these risks, and thus underestimated
them. Here, we should pause to take note of the compensation and promo-
tion structure at Enron, which resembled many other hyper-competitive
14 William Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275
(2002). My account here is derived from Bratton's article, press reports, and the February 1,
2002 Powers Committee report to the Enron board.
15 On managerial aspiration levels, see generally James G. March & Zur Shapira, Manage-
rial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking, 33 MGMT. SCI. 1404 (1987).
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firms in this regard. Enron harshly penalized the laggards at the firm, which,
on average, tends to lead to herding behavior (risk aversion). To counteract
this, the company had to magnify the reward structure considerably for those
who ended up as stellar performers-a winner-take-all kind of tournament.
Presumably this worked, and key people gradually placed more and
more risky bets in a variety of fields, increasingly outside of the firm's core
competence. And predictably, many of these turned bad. Here is where
some basic principles of social cognition come into play, perniciously. High
ego people are slow to recognize problems as attributable to their mistakes;
rather, they minimize them as controllable and seek to c6rrect them through
an increase in persistence and aggression. Although this is an adaptive strat-
egy on average, it can easily compound the risk (essentially, the phenomenon
of throwing good money after bad). With a streak of bad luck, the person
finds himself deeper and deeper in trouble. By the time people face up to the
facts, they are in a loss frame, and the organizational structure and culture
leaves little choice except a cover-up and even more risk-taking as the only
means of escaping the bad situation. In sum-and in previous work I've
called this the "optimism-commitment whipsaw"16-their overconfidence
commits them to a high-risk strategy; once committed to it, they are trapped.
I suspect that at multiple, overlapping levels in Enron, this happened.
Individual traders probably fell prey to it, and the key principals in the orga-
nizational structures (Fastow and his close confederates, and perhaps Skill-
ing) probably did too. I would guess, then, that the SPE's were initially
thought of as legitimate devices for moving assets off the company's books to
keep earnings up and the stock price high-legitimate, at least, within the
accounting conventions that apparently permitted so much make-up. The
self-dealing was rationalized, perhaps rightly, as offering speed and effi-
ciency, and the key players had no conscious intention of disloyalty. But as
the bets moved in the wrong direction, their natural response was simply to
bolster their initial choices, thereby gradually sinking deeper into the "big
Muddy" of cover-up and deception when good luck failed to come their
way. 17 Early on in the bolstering, concealment was rationalized as buying
time to solve the problem, which they believed they surely would. Later,
they may have simply felt trapped.
Whatever deception there was no doubt included a large amount of self-
deception, perhaps until the very end. This is important, for among other
things it goes to the level of "intentionality" underlying whatever was wrong
at Enron. Objectively, in hindsight, it is hard to imagine how someone could
be responsible for risky choices that go bad and be anything other than cor-
rupt for failing to reveal the problems promptly. Psychologically, however,
that is hardly surprising. I have no idea when, if ever, the key insiders at
Enron lay awake one night and realized that they were responsible for a very
16 Langevoort, supra note 3, at 167; see also John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize
Individuals into Evildoing, in CODES OF CONDUCr: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS
ETHICS 13, 16-25 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996).
17 For an interesting account of a team gradually redefining itself based on the need to
deceive others whose response would, they rationalize, be disruptive and foolish (and hence
unworthy of respect), see generally Levy, supra note 10.
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big mess and simply lacked the ability to clean it up. That is an admission
few high-ego, high-Mach people make easily, even to themselves. The famil-
iar term for this response is denial. 18
As we go higher in the company and farther away from the SPE transac-
tions, to Ken Lay and the board of directors, particularly, we see similar so-
cial and cognitive forces at work. First, this is a company culture that
discourages the reporting of bad news to superiors-"don't bring me
problems, bring me solutions!" And it is only, like nearly all, companies
heavily built on trust rather than aggressive monitoring. Again, in hindsight,
it is hard to imagine, given the conflict of interest, how so much discretion
could have been given to Fastow regarding the workings of the SPE's. The
answer is that he was trusted, by and large. Nor was it necessarily an unrea-
sonable trust, early on. High-Mach people are very loyal when times are
good (the optimism link, again) and there is gain to be had from cooperation.
He could thus have laid ample groundwork to justify the trust Lay and the
board had. But this was the cognitive trap. Having committed so strongly to
Fastow, Skilling, and their vision, the higher-ups were resistant to disconfirm-
ing data as it began to trickle in, because it was threatening to them too. If
so, whatever disloyalty there might have been down below was harder to spot
at the time than we now might think.
IV. Conclusion
My concern, then, is that what I have described above is natural within
hyper-competitive organizations. To be suie, Enron-like harm is rare, but
that may be simply a function of its rarefied situation: a first-mover in the
suddenly important world of energy resources with an immense initial streak
of good fortune, later hit just as quickly by a streak of bad. No doubt there
was a "cowboy-culture" there that may have been more stark than most,
which contributed to the overreaching. But I suspect that we would find En-
ron-like tendencies in many firms, for the reasons I've given.
If that is the case, then I am more skeptical than Larry Mitchell that we
should give tournament survivors in these kinds of firms more freedom to
manage, on the assumption that the resulting moral autonomy will cause
them to gravitate toward the benign. As I've said, I think stock price obses-
sion is more a symptom than a disease, and any remedies for the resulting
externalities will have to be more heavy-handed than simply enhancing man-
agerial freedom from investor pressure. Again, I applaud many of the book's
specifics. But I won't hold my breath waiting for spontaneous enlightenment
from corporate cultures and hierarchies formed in the nasty world of business
competition.
18 See Patricia Sellers, CEOs in Denial, FORTUNE, June 21, 1999, at 80. More formally,
from an organizational perspective, see Andrew Brown & Ken Starkey, Organizational Identity
and Learning: A Psychodynamic Perspective, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 102, 105-06 (2000).
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